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Introduction 
It is well-known that a closed economy’s central bank has the position of a total monopoly: 
only the national bank is allowed – by law – to issue the economy’s currency, thus if someone 
wants to use Forints of British Pounds for whatever it is, he or she is first of all buyer of 
products offered by the Hungarian National Bank, or by the Bank of England, resp. The same 
is true for the European Central Bank: the Euro, the common currency of a lot of member 
states of the European Union, is offered only by the ECB. Consequently, as in the closed 
national economies, monopoly profit – the so-called seigniorage – does also exist in the Euro-
zone. On the other side, an essential difference has to be considered. In the case of closed 
national economies the area officially controlled by the national currency is more or less the 
territory of the country, i. e. the area is determined by the political borders. Considering the 
Euro as common currency of several countries this is obviously not true, implying the 
question what is the area controlled by the Euro. 
 
  
The Spatial Monopoly 
From the introductionary remarks it follows that for the present analysis of the ECB’s market 
position requires a spatial approach. Satisfying this requirement it makes sense to use models 
and results developed in spatial economics. (For details see e. g. SCHÖLER [2005], 
 
Let us assume in a certain area a special good or service is offered by a single firm, the 
monopoly; the quantity of this good or service is denoted by q . For the sake of simplicity let 
be the area a line. Consumers demanding this good or service are equally distributed over the 
area. Consumers’ demand can be described by a linear demand function, i.e., ( ) pˆbapˆq D −= , 
where pˆ  is the market price to be paid for one unit of the good or service.i
p
 The problem is 
that the potential consumers are located at different places, i. e., their distance to the 
monopoly differs from consumer to consumer. But, however, wherever a buyer plans to 
consume the good, he or she has to cover transportations costs. If the consumer will travel 
from his or her home to the firm where the product can be bought at mill-price , he or she 
has to bear the traveling cost; if, in another case, the product will be sold by represents of the 
firm or by traders directly at the consumers’ home, the market price will exceed the mill-price 
by the costs for transportation. In any case, the final price consumers have to pay consists of 
the mill price and transportation costs. Let r  be the distance between the consumers’ home 
and the firm, and let’s denote by t  the transportation costs of one unit of the commodity 
related to one distance unit, e. g., costs necessary to transport 1 gallon oil over the distance of 
one kilometer. Consequently, tr  will denote the transportation costs for one commodity unit’s 
transfer over 1 km. Summing up, the market price to be paid by a consumer living in a 
distance of r from the firm is trppˆ += . Therefore the individual demand of a consumer 
living in r distance from the producer is 
 ( ) ( )trpbapq D +−= . (1) 
To obtain the total demand on the market, DQ , one has to sum up all individual demands with 
respect to the distance, i. e.,  
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(2) 
or 
 ( ) ( ) 2D btRRbpa2rQ −−= . (3) 
Here R is an assumed maximum distance between the firm and consumers demanding the 
good or service the monopoly is offering. The concrete value of R is up to now totally 
unknown, it has been assumed only that such a maximum does exist. Later it will be shown 
that it is possible to derive an exact value for R, with other words: the value of R to be derived 
will determine the market size too. (See Graphic No. 1) 
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If we assume a linear cost functionii
 
 
( ) FCkQQK += , (4) 
where k denotes the marginal costs, the profit can be expressed by the following term: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] FCbtRRbpa2kp 2 −−−−=Π . (5) 
The firm is now setting the mill-price p as that price maximizing the profit. Therefore p has to 
satisfy the condition 0
dp
d
=
Π , i. e., the firm’s optimal mill-price is given by 
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(6) 
Substituting this mill-price into the profit equation (5), one can see that the profit depends 
only on R: 
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 Consequently, the profit maximizing distance value ∗R  expresses the market size. Therefore, 
one has to set 0
dR
d
=
Π∗  which is satisfied by 
 ( )
bt3
bka2R −=∗ . 
(7) 
The economic interpretation of expression (7) can be given as follows: The market size 
depends on the marginal production cost (k), on the price sensitivity of the consumers (b), and 
– last, but not least – on the reservation price (
b
a
). The lower are the marginal production 
costs and/or the lower is the price sensitivity, the higher is ∗R . The same effect, the extension 
of the market, will be observed, if the reservation price would increase. Market size is 
therefore determined by the behavior of both economic actors, the firm and the consumer(s), 
and market size will change if at least one of these actors will develop and apply a new 
strategy. 
 
 
Monetary distances 
In this point the above general model of a spatial monopoly will be applied to the Euro-zone 
with the European Central Bank as monopoly providing the Euro-zone with money and with 
the economic actors in the Euro-zone as “consumers”. At the first moment, however, it is not 
very realistic to assume for the Euro-zone an one-dimensional market as it had been done in 
the general model – the Euro market does quite obviously not exist “along a line”. That’s 
right! But, first of all, the analysis of one-dimensional markets is much more easier than the 
investigation of two-, or higher dimensional markets. It can be shown that the one-
dimensional model could be extended to a two-dimensional one. (See SCHÖLER [2005], Fujita 
– Krugman – Venables [1999]) The only thing one would have to do is to summarize the 
aggregated demands “along a line” for all possible lines in the two-dimensional surface.iii 
Furtherwise, it has to be taken into consideration that in the present approach distance does 
not mean the traditional length of a line or of a way between two points in the – let’s say – 
geographical space. More generally spoken, distance is now simply the difference between 
values of the same properties different elements of a given set have. (For more examples see 
e. g. Hevér [2012])  
Analyzing monetary problems distance can be interpreted as the difference between interest 
rates, inflation rates or quantities of money observable at different points (national economies 
or regions) of the geographical space. Using the expression of distance in this sense, does not 
mean to find out how far are these national economies or regions from each other in 
kilometer, but to investigate how close they are to each other in their monetary conditions. 
Therefore, a national economy may be a neighbor of another national economy, but taking 
into account monetary characteristics, may be that they are far away from each other if 
monetary conditions or performances would be considered, and, of course, the opposite may 
be also true: national economies on different continents can be similar from monetary – or any 
other – point of view. 
 
 
The ECB’s optimal interest rate 
In the following part the more general results about spatial monopolies will be applied to the 
monetary sector. In 2002 most of the member states of the European Union have introduced 
the Euro as joint currency. The European Central Bank provides the member states of the 
Euro-zone with money, and – this makes it possible to apply the above model – this bank is 
the only institution issuing Euros. On the other side there are economic actors (firms, 
households, governments, regional authorities, etc.) demanding this money; the number of the 
economic actors is n. Because of the different economic and social situation of the actors, they 
are faced with different nominal interest rates – the better is an actor’s economic situation the 
lower is the risk premium and thus, the lower is the interest rate to be paid for loans. Let’s 
denote the individual interest rate of actor i with ir , the most efficient actors’ interest rate is 
therefore the lowest one, this will be denoted by minr , the highest nominal interest rate ( maxr ) 
has to be accepted by the economic actor with the lowest performance. It is obvious, that 
max
i
min rrr ≤≤ , for all n...,,1i = . Since the lowest interest rate does not contain any risk 
premium, minr  can be considered as the ECB’s “pure” interest rate ( ECBr ), similar to the mill 
price in the case of the spatial monopoly. Therefore the individual interest rate of the ith 
economic actor can be described by the expression ( ) iECBimaxECBi yryyrr ∆ρ+=−ρ+=  , 
where maxy  is the income level of the most efficient economy, and iy  denotes income level of 
economic actor i, the income difference for any individual actor related to the most efficient 
one is denoted by iy∆ . Verbally expressed this means that the closer is the performance of the 
individual economic actor to that of the best one, the lower is the risk premium, an increasing 
difference between these two income levels would imply spreading nominal interest rates.  
Money demand of actor i depends on real income and on the nominal interest rate, so the 
traditional money demand function can be used to describe i’s behavior on the money market, 
or using the linear formiv
 
:  
( ) iiiiDiDi krmyr,ymm −== . (8) 
Taking into account the risk premium, the expression has the form 
 ( )iECBiDi yrkmym ∆ρ+−= .  
 
Total money demand is the sum of all individual money demands whatever is the difference 
of their individual performances related to that of the best economic actor, i.e.,  
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where γ  denotes the income difference between the economic actors with the highest and 
with the lowest performance. Applying this procedure to the individual money demand 
functions, one obtains for the total money demand  
 ( ) ( ) 2ECBiiiD k2
1krmyr,yM ργ−γ−=∆ . 
(9) 
If the European Central Bank would create exactly that amount of money demanded by the 
economic actors, the total revenue would be  
 ( )
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(10) 
 
Let’s assume a simple linear (total) cost function representing the ECB’s costs for creating the 
M quantity of money  
 FCMTC +µ= , (11) 
where µ  is the constant marginal cost and FC stands for fix costs. Using eqs. (10) and (11), 
the ECB’s profit can be expressed as the difference between total revenues and total costs, i. 
e.,  
 ( ) ( ) FCk
2
1krmyr 2ECBi
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 ργ−γ−µ−=Π . 
(12) 
The strategy of the ECB is to find the interest rate maximizing its profit. Therefore one has to 
calculate 0
dr
d
ECB =
Π
. Finally, the result is  
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(13) 
 
This equation contain behavioral parameters, as µ , k , m , and ρ , but is can also be seen that 
the income difference ( γ ) will also influence the optimal interest rate. The bigger are the 
income differences in the area the European Central Bank offers its money the lower must be 
the optimal interest rate. The reason seems to be quite clear: income differences will imply 
differences in the risk premiums to be paid by the less developed individuals. But lower 
development and paying risk premiums means huge burdens for these individuals, regions or 
countries. Therefore, if the European Central Bank would like to provide these actors with the 
joint currency, the „pure” („mill”) interest rate must be kept on a low level. 
Accepting this, it has to be seen that the consequence is a special process of counter-selection: 
To pay the mark-up price, the risk premium, less developed individuals have to pay a 
relatively higher price for the joint currency than the higher developed part of the region. 
 
 
The area controlled by the European Central Bank 
Using (13) it is possible to characterize the area controlled by the European Central Bank. 
Substituting the value of the optimal interest rate (13) into the profit function (12), and 
maximizing this with respect to the income difference γ , i. e., analyzing the condition 
0
d
d
=
γ
Π , for which it can be derived that 0k4m4kmy4k8k3 222i
222 =µ+−ρ−ρµγ+γρ . 
This is a quadratic equation in γ  with the solutionv
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It is not the concrete form of this expression which is of interest, but the message: If the 
European Central Bank would follow an economically meaningful strategy, the only those 
economic actors, countries, etc. should be provided with the joint currency, where the income 
difference in relation to the most efficient economic actors, or countries does not exceed a 
certain value. On the other hand, if the joint currency would be offered to economies with an 
income level differing from the most efficient economy’s level by more than γ , the European 
Central Bank will be unable to fulfill its duties according to the requirements of economic 
efficiency. 
Of course, arguing on the present abstract level it is totally impossible to comment, or even to 
evaluate the economic or monetary policy followed to stabilize the Euro, this can be done 
only after intensive empirical research. But, however, the introduction of the currency used by 
a lot of the EU member states, has had more a political motivation than an economic one. The 
demonstration of a qualitatively new level in the continent’s unification process had been 
considered as much more important than the integration of the national economies into a 
European economy. From this point of view it is not surprising that the sovereign debt crisis 
in several European economies – expressing the level of their economic performance in 
relation to the so-called European living standard rationally expected by the citizens of these 
member states – is in a very close connection with the Euro-crisis – expressing that the most 
important monetary authority of the European Union is unable to bridge the gap between the 
income levels of regions in the politically unified Europe. With other word: the Euro-zone is 
to big – to heterogenous – for the European Central Bank, or, as Kenneth Rogoff wrote about 
the Euro zone: “the optimal single currency area is probably still a country, at least when two 
or more large countries are involved” (Rogoff [2012]. 
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i Since the above demand function corrsponds  to the inverse demand function q
b
1
b
apˆ −= , it becomes clear 
that 
b
a
 represents the so-called reservation price, i. e. that maximum amount of money offered by at least one 
consumer for one unit of the product, or: nobody is willing to pay more for one unit of the good or service 
offered by the firm. 
ii This is equivalent with the assumption of a linearly homogenous technology, i. e. multiplying the factor 
quantities used in the production process will lead to an increase in output characterized by the same multiplier. 
 
iii If the two-dimensional surface would be a simple circle, then the demand described by equation (3) would be 
the total demand of all consumers located on a line between the center of the circle and a certain point on the 
circle’s line. To obtain the demand of all consumers living inner the circle or on the circle’s line the line has to 
rotate through 3600. Denoting the angel between the original line and any other line by ϕ , then ϕ  has to change 
from 0 till 360, or between 0 and π2 . The total demand of all consumers in the circle is therefore 
( ) ϕ





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π
ddrbtrbpar)R(Q
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D
c . From this formula it can be seen that the change from the one-
dimensional market to the two-dimensional one does not influence the basic statement about what the market 
size is depending on; the only effect is a more complex formal expression. 
 
iv At the moment it is assmumed that the real income of the ith economic actor is independent on the interest rate 
he is faced with. 
v Of course, the quadratic equation has two solutions, but the only this one can be interpreted from economic 
point of view; the other solution is definitely negative,  wich would imply a negative income difference. 
